INTRODUCTION
In May 2007, Oaktree Capital Management LLC, a U.S.-based hedge fund adviser with over $40 billion in assets under management, sold approximately 14% of its equity for more than $800 million in a widespread underwritten offering to a number of prospective purchasers.' If the offering had been a public one it would have been the year's sixth-largest initial public offering by a domestic issuer. 2 But Oaktree deliberately chose not to raise this capital on the public market, thereby forgoing a listing on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) or Nasdaq. Instead, Oaktree made its initial offering on the U.S. private market. The company thereafter listed its equity securities on Goldman Sachs & Co.'s non-public market, the "GS Tradable Unregistered Equity OTC Market" (GSTrUE). 3 On the heels of this offering, Apollo Management L.P., a private equity fund adviser, conducted a similarly structured equity offering, privately raising $828 million and immediately thereafter listing the equity securities on GSTrUE. 4 These two offerings were historically extraordinary. They were the first two substantial underwritten offerings and listings of domestic equity securities on a U.S. private rather than public market. 5 The two offerings
The essay concludes by briefly assessing the prospects for federal securities reform and suggests a new SEC regulatory-process model grounded in regulatory cost-benefit analysis. A new global capital market landscape is inexorably being created, a reality that the SEC will inevitably have to acknowledge as the flaws in its current regulation and regulatory approach are increasingly teased forth. It is a transformation that has a real chance to engender substantive change in the scope, structure and content of the federal securities laws. The SEC will inevitably be forced to act. If the SEC promulgates regulation that not only pays heed to the new capital markets paradigm, but does so in a manner comporting with sound regulatory process, it will do so in a more economical and responsive manner.
I. THE NEW PARADIGM A. MARKET PROLIFERATION
Securities markets are proliferating globally, growing in prominence and meaningfully competing with the regulated U.S. public securities market. The primary regulatory consequences are manifold. First, as securities offering activity increasingly occurs on these alternative markets, the U.S. public securities market-the regulatory focus of the SEC-is rapidly losing its dominant position as the principal place to raise equity capital.' 0 Second, market proliferation exposes a dilemma for the SEC. The simple prohibition or regulation of a security is no longer a complete regulatory solution. In such a circumstance, prohibitory or restrictive regulation of this nature will simply cause trading or investing in the relevant security to migrate to foreign or private markets. Third, this shift raises issues and prospects of enhanced SEC regulation of private markets to the extent that it implicates the SEC's regulatory mission-the protection of investors and the integrity of markets generally."'
The Private Domestic Offering and Trading Market
The private securities offering market in the United States is structured to comply with the federal securities law exemptions for registration of securities. Generally, as long as an issuer solicits and raises capital from investors with a certain aggregate minimum net worth, the offering need not be registered and only limited provisions of the securities laws apply, 11. The movement of securities offering and trading to these alternative markets also raises investor equality issues as retail investors are increasingly deprived of investing opportunities.
primarily the anti-fraud strictures. 12 For purposes of underwritten and widespread offerings, the principal private exemption relied upon is the Rule 144A exemption under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended (Securities Act). 13 Rule 144A exempts securities offerings from the resale restrictions of the Securities Act as long as the offering is confined to qualified institutional buyers. 14 These buyers are generally institutional investors who hold more than $100 million worth of securities. 5 Historically, this market was largely comprised of non-domestic issuers offering equity securities in the United States, and domestic and nondomestic issuers offering debt securities in the United States.' 6 However, the Rule 144A market for domestic issuers of equity has experienced extraordinary growth in recent years. Chart IA sets forth the aggregate amount of equity raised by domestic issuers in initial public offerings versus private Rule 144A placements for the period 2000 through 2007.
Chart 1A17 84,523, at 80,641-42 (Apr. 23, 1990 ). Generally, a corporate issuer is classified under the U.S. securities laws as either a U.S. domestic issuer or a foreign private issuer. Foreign private issuers benefit from certain exemptions under the U.S. securities laws that are not available to U.S. domestic issuers. For simplicity's sake, throughout this essay, foreign private issuers are also referred to as "non-U.S. companies," "non-U.S. issuers," or "foreign companies" and are generally deemed to refer to foreign companies.
US IPOs versus 144A Placements
16. Technically the Rule 144A offering exemption is utilized by the underwriter. This eclipse is more evident in the non-domestic issuer market. Chart lB sets forth the number of, and aggregate dollar amount raised by, nondomestic issuers in Rule 144A equity offerings compared to equity offerings on a U.S. securities exchange for the period 1996 through Chart IB shows that in 2006, non-U.S. issuers engaged in initial public offerings raised $64.7 billion in the U.S. private equity market through Rule 144A equity offerings, compared to only $10.8 billion in the U.S. public equity market. 21 This disparity is one also present in the U.S. debt market, a place where offering activity has principally occurred in the private market. In 2007, non-domestic issuers raised $51.634 billion in Rule 144A debt offerings compared to only $7.13 billion on the public market. 22 This private offering activity occurs largely outside the strictures of the Securities Act and beyond the SEC's supervision. Moreover, both domestic and non-domestic issuers can utilize exemptions to side-step the on-going reporting requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (Exchange Act) after a Rule 144A offering. For example, if a domestic issuer does not make a registered offering of securities, the periodic reporting regime under the Exchange Act is only triggered for a domestic issuer once it has more than $10 million in assets and a class of equity securities held by more than 500 holders of record. 23 For non-U.S. issuers, Rule 12g3-2b of the Exchange Act provides an exemption to the Exchange Act reporting requirements. 24 A non-domestic issuer who elects to furnish to the SEC certain information that it is otherwise required to file with its home regulator, and whose security is not listed or quoted on a U.S. market, is also exempt from the reporting requirements of the Exchange Act.
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The result of these exemptions is the emergence of a private, or "shadow," securities market in the United States. It is a market increasingly competitive with the public one. As it grows in size, networks are being established to capture greater public offering activity. For example, on November 12, 2007, twelve investment banks and the Nasdaq announced the creation of a private equity securities trading platform, Portal Alliance, for the listing and trading of equity securities offered under Rule 144A. 26 Portal Alliance is a combination of four private securities-trading markets previously established by these banks and Nasdaq, and includes the GSTrUE market. 7 The private listings markets are about to be consolidated 24. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g3-2(b)(l). 25 . Id. Generally, these exemptions are most relevant and utilized with respect to equity issuances. Historically, and for regulatory reasons related primarily to sales to insurance companies, issuers offering debt securities have typically registered their securities with the SEC after the offering in a process commonly known as an Exxon Capital or A/B exchange. But, in the new millennium this practice may be declining. One study has found that, at least in the private equity context, there has been an increase in the number of small-and medium-sized issuers choosing not to have a follow-on registration after a high-yield Rule 144A debt offering. NYSE and Nasdaq combined. 3 8 A recent study found that, in the wake of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the increased regulatory burden and costs it imposes, this growth in non-domestic listings on the London markets has accelerated as issuers choose to list on the LSE or AIM rather than a U.S. stock market. 39 The rise in non-domestic listings on non-U.S. markets has important implications for the U.S. market. The flow of international capital and listings signifies the competitiveness of the United States in the global market. 40 If the United States no longer attracts its historical proportionate share of listings and capital-raising it is a possible sign of its decreased global competitiveness. 41 Moreover, these non-U.S. markets, particularly the LSE, are likely to continue to gain traction and build mass and volume as their domestic capital markets continue to grow. The recent spate of global stock exchange consolidation is only likely to compound this effect, as stock markets offer similar trading technology in different regulatory markets, thereby enhancing issuer portability. 42 This directly implicates the regulatory calculus of the SEC: if issuers have viable choices outside the United States, U.S. regulation, even to the extent it increases social utility on an aggregate domestic basis, can substantially and adversely impact the United States' ability to compete in the global market for capital and listings.
B. INTERMEDIATION AND DERETAILIZATION
A second phenomenon substantially affecting the U.S. capital market is the growing intermediation of investing. 3 The rise of mutual funds, pension 40. While many argue that the U.S. is in competitive decline, the evidence is more nuanced, and at least part of this appears to be based on the increasing strength of alternative markets and the tendency of their domestic issuers to list there, rather than a decline in the United States ability to attract capital and listings. See The aggregate assets under management of mutual funds have increased at an annual rate of 14.35% during this time period. And as of December 31, 2006, the assets under management of domestic mutual funds comprised 54% of the combined aggregate market capitalization of the NYSE and Nasdaq. 46 A popular perception is that the rise in mutual fund holdings is the product of increased utilization by investors of defined contribution plans, such as IRA and 401(k)s, and the mutual fund A separate investment intermediation trend among private, sophisticated investors has mimicked the spectacular rise in public investment in mutual funds and pension funds. These investors can and do invest in mutual funds, but also have the ability to invest in capital pools generally unavailable to public investors, such as hedge funds and private equity. 
Historical Hedge Fund Assets Under Management and Net Asset Flows ($ billions) (Source: HFR Industry Reports HFR Inc. 2007)
Pension funds and other intermediaries are also significant investors in hedge funds and other private capital pools such as private equity funds. 52 This investment is often also intermediated through funds-of-funds-funds created to invest in other hedge funds or private equity funds. 53 Individual, sophisticated investors often do not meet the minimum investment qualifications for a hedge fund or private equity fund, and therefore also invest in funds-of-funds with lower investment requirements. 54 Hedge funds-of-funds likely comprise more than half of the invested capital in hedge funds, and as of year-end 2007 it was estimated that globally, hedge funds-of-funds with greater than $1 billion in assets under management held approximately $1.1 trillion in assets. 5 5 The source of investment and investors for each of these intermediaries is different. However, their dominant presence in the U.S. capital markets spells a secular trend of deretailization and the diminishing relevance of the retail investor. Public securities are now increasingly held through intermediaries and other private funds, such as endowment and sovereign [Vol. 2 wealth funds, rather than by retail investors. As a result, one recent study found that retail investors, who once owned more than 90% of publicly traded equity, now own less than 30%.56 Retail investors are simply no longer the mainstay of the public markets and are unlikely to return to this position.
The dominance of private, sophisticated investors over the securities markets affects capital flows in the securities offering market. First, the rise of the Rule 144A market 57 is in part due to the increased number of intermediaries available to purchase securities in this market. More generally, these intermediaries provide a significant source of capital outside the public securities offering process. Second, the greater resources available to these intermediaries can reduce agency costs to the extent these intermediaries provide a gatekeeper function and otherwise agitate for corporate value creation. 58 Finally, greater intermediary investment should theoretically lead to reduced market volatility and speculation as investing decisions shift from retail investors who do not generally have the professional investment skill to intermediaries with such talent.
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Each intermediary type also has unique, consequential effects on the market. For example, private equity offers public companies an option to exit the public markets entirely; subsequent capital requirements for the company can also be met in the private markets through other intermediaries or financial institutions, placing the company largely outside the purview of the federal securities laws and SEC oversight. 60 Hedge fund trading provides deep liquidity to both the equity and the derivatives markets.
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' Hedge funds also often serve as activist investors and counterparties in highly complex financial transactions, which other regulated financial entities, such as banks, may lack the ability to do. 62 The presence of these intermediaries and their effect on the capital markets shift the calculus for securities regulation. The Securities Act and the Exchange Act are designed to protect retail investors. 6 4 Yet, if sophisticated intermediaries now undertake the bulk of investing, the protections of these Acts become procedural, and the opportunities for deregulation increase. More specifically, if investors in public offerings and public securities are largely sophisticated intermediaries, the protections required by the federal securities laws can arguably be left in some measure to private bargaining, with intermediaries serving as agents for the public investor stub, if any. 65 In these circumstances, compliance with the federal securities laws becomes, to some extent, an unnecessary transaction cost. Intermediaries also provide a strong alternative supply of private capital to issuers who wish to avoid the costs associated with registration, the scrutiny of the public offering process generally, and on-going public reporting obligations. As the private securities market develops further, these intermediaries and the structures created to accommodate them, and the private offering market generally, create a more viable alternative to an offering on the U.S. public markets. 67 Finally, these intermediaries create Whenever pursuant to this subchapter the Commission is engaged in rulemaking and is required to consider or determine whether an action is necessary or appropriate in the public interest, the Commission shall also consider, in addition to the protection of investors, whether the action will promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation.
Id.
65. However, such laws may still provide value in maintaining investor confidence and preventing rent-seeking by these agents themselves. consequence is, not only is a significant portion of the U.S. capital market increasingly outside the federal securities laws, but many influential market investors that raise their own unique issues also exist apart from SEC oversight. 72 The ability of the SEC to effectively regulate the securities markets is correspondingly made more difficult.
C. MARKET INNOVATION AND SOPHISTICATION
Capital markets are increasingly sophisticated and complex due to the quickening pace of financial innovation. Rapid advances in finance, both structural and theoretical, have enhanced the capacity of market participants to create and price financial products. 73 regulators grappling with the complexity and rapid, innovative development of these products.Y 4 The rise of the U.S. derivatives market is a primary example of these advances. As of June 30, 2007, the aggregate notional value of derivatives in the United States was $347.1 trillion, compared to $865.6 billion in 1987.] This is a market that exists due to the efforts of a core group of academics and financial professionals who invented the mathematical arsenal to price and structure these derivatives. 7 6 The U.S. derivatives market is increasingly flexible and complex: It consists of not just forwards, futures, and options on equities and commodities, but derivatives are now priced and issued on a variety of more sophisticated and harder-to-price assets and events, such as property and weather. 77 The credit derivative market, which consists of products designed to allocate credit risk and lubricate credit markets, has become a particularly valuable component of the U.S. capital market. As the products increase in variety and complexity, they increase the ability of financial institutions to extend credit. 78 More tellingly, these products and markets have the potential to lessen the need for issuers to access the public equity markets. The use of derivatives for hedging purposes can stabilize capital flows and make credit or other alternative capital a more viable source for funding needs against the transaction and other costs associated with public equity. As Professors Ronald Gilson and Charles Whitehead have recently theorized, financial alchemy may now be sufficiently advanced to structure and discretely 77. For example, the S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Indices measure changes in the value of the U.S. residential real estate market (on a weighted composite index), as well as in ten specific metropolitan regions across the United States. Futures contracts based on these indices are traded on the CME Group derivatives exchange. See CME GROUP, S&P/CASE-SHILLER HOME PRICE The rapidity of financial innovation and the related consequences create at least four regulatory issues. 8 3 First, these products are often difficult to regulate-their complexity and risk are hard to comprehend and dissect. 84 The current sub-prime mortgage crisis and apparent mispricing of collateralized debt obligations based on these mortgage securities aptly illustrate the systemic and regulatory issues associated with more complex financial instruments. Second, to the extent federal securities regulation is rule-rather than principle-based, it is less responsive to rapid changes in the structure and nature of the capital markets.
8 5 Moreover, there is a permanence to this gap as adaptation to new regulation is immediate due to financial innovation, but the regulatory process takes years to respond.
This innovation can also create issues that defy regulation. For example, a number of academics have recently published papers setting forth models for creation of synthetic hedge funds. 8 can now make investments "akin" to having actually invested in their own hedge funds. 87 Yet, the SEC has adamantly maintained that hedge fund investments should be "off-limits" to public investors. 88 If hedge funds are indeed too risky for retail investment, presumably virtual investments like synthetic hedge funds are as well. How does the SEC regulate to prohibit virtual investments such as a synthetic hedge fund? There is likely no way. 89 Third, direct federal regulation of the U.S. securities markets is in large measure allocated between the SEC and the Commodities Futures and Trade Commission (CFTC). The CFTC generally regulates non-equity derivatives while the SEC regulates equity derivatives and securities, and each has a separate regulatory regime. 90 An informed and rational economic market actor therefore has latitude to structure publicly traded products to arbitrage between SEC or CFTC regulation, depending upon the regulatory costs imposed. 9 ' Moreover, the rise of derivatives generally and the CFTC's expanding domain has limited the SEC or any one regulator's ability to completely supervise the U.S. capital markets. This trend may affect the SEC particularly, as the increased ability of issuers to manage risk and capital needs through derivatives as an alternative to public equity capital increasingly deprives the SEC of jurisdiction over corporate capital 92 raising.
Finally, financial innovation means that the simple prohibition or confining regulation of a financial product is no longer a panacea if demand for the security continues. Creative finance professionals will simply offer substitute financial products that mimic the prohibited or restricted investment. For example, the rise in special purpose acquisition companies (SPACs) can be attributed in large part to financial innovators utilizing a [Vol. 2 financial product to side-step prohibitory regulation on private equity funds offering their investments to the public.
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II. SEC REGULATORY FAILURE IN THE NEW PARADIGM
The new regulatory paradigm is one of complexity and dilemma for the SEC. Market proliferation, intermediary investing, deretailization and increased financial innovation combine with other emergent forces to create strong alternatives for raising capital. 94 Issuers are no longer largely confined to the public markets for equity and other capital-raising. The SEC rule-making process is thus subject to greater competitive force. Prohibitory or unduly burdensome securities regulation will simply cause capital and capital-raising to migrate to alternative markets. Additionally, substitute financial products can now be devised to circumvent and arbitrage SEC regulation. Beyond these forces, the entire structure and content of SEC regulation is possibly in question. This is particularly true if public equity markets are entering a revolutionary transformational stage where, by definition, they are no longer the optimal place to list and raise capital, and public equity capital and listings are no longer a necessity or even desirable capital provider or lowest-cost risk-bearer. The paradigm shift is real and consequential.
Yet, the SEC has largely refused to acknowledge these developments. Instead, the SEC appears to be focused on tending the current code and regulating as it has historically, without heed to the new paradigm. The result is regulation that is increasingly inapposite and which fails to adequately account for the increased mobility and sources of capital and the changed structure of the U.S. capital markets generally. A full analysis of SEC regulatory practices and their drivers is beyond the scope of this essay. Nonetheless, the problems and tensions with recent SEC rulemaking and the effect of the new capital market paradigm can be highlighted by examining the recent SEC regulatory experience with hedge funds. Fund Reform Effort, 12 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1 (2006) . that there were 9,462 hedge funds. 96 Yet, until this millennium, SEC regulatory attention to these capital pools was, at least publicly, limited. 97 Then, in 1998 the global macro hedge fund Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) spectacularly imploded. The collapse of LTCM not only resulted in a $4.6 billion loss for its investors but imperiled the stability of the entire global capital market. 98 This event unleashed a host of regulatory forces spurring the SEC to more closely scrutinize and attempt to regulate hedge funds.
In 2004, these developments culminated with SEC action. The SEC Commissioners voted 3-2 to adopt Rule 203(b)(3)-2 under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (Advisers Act), 99 which requires almost all domestic hedge fund advisers to register with the SEC. 1 0 0 New Rule 203(b)(3)-2 amended prior SEC Rule 203(b)(3), which had permitted an adviser to count each fund it advised as a client, thereby side-stepping SEC registration requirements. 10 l Under the amended rule, investment advisers meeting the definition of "private funds" would generally be required to look through their advised funds and count each investor, as opposed to each fund, as a client to determine whether the adviser was required to register. Circuit Court of Appeals vacated and remanded the new rule, on the grounds that the SEC's "interpretation of the word 'client' comes close to violating the plain language of the statute," and was arbitrary. 1°4 In response to the D.C. Circuit decision, the SEC abandoned its attempt to require hedge fund advisers to register under the Advisers Act. 0 5 Instead, in 2006, the SEC proposed to tighten the restrictions on the type of investors who could invest in hedge funds. The SEC proposed that the definition of accredited investor under Regulation D be amended for "investment pools" (i.e., hedge funds) that rely on the Rule 3(c)(1) exemption from registration under the Investment Company Act.106 Previously, an investor need only have had an aggregate net worth of $1 million dollars or an individual income which exceeded $200,000 (or joint income with the person's spouse exceeding $300,000) in each of the two most recent years to qualify as an accredited investor under Regulation D, and permit them to invest in a Rule 3(c)(1) hedge fund or private equity fund.
0 7 The proposed rule would revise the definition of accredited investor so that a natural person could qualify and be allowed to invest in hedge funds only if he or she met the previous tests of net worth or income, and owned at least $2.5 million in investments.1 0 8
These attempts by the SEC at hedge fund regulation have been criticized as both schizophrenic and irrational. 0 9 In its first regulatory foray, the SEC attempted to address systemic issues of risk and transparency by requiring hedge fund advisers to submit to SEC oversight and regulation by registering under the Advisers Act.'10 Yet, system-wide risk issues are largely the regulatory purview of the Treasury and Federal Reserve, and the latter notably opposed this regulation."' Moreover, the Aug. 30, 2004) . The SEC has also skirted this bar by arguing that small investors are now widely invested in hedge funds through intermediaries such as pension registration requirements the SEC sought to impose were equivalent to CFTC regulations at the time applicable to a majority of hedge funds.' 1 2
The SEC then abandoned these concerns in its latest rule proposals, instead shifting its regulatory focus to protection of investors, a core mission. 13 However, the rationale of this tactical change is equally puzzling. To justify placing further restrictions on the type of investor that can invest in hedge funds, the SEC stated:
Not only do private pools often use complicated investment strategies, but there is minimal information available about them in the public domain. Accordingly, investors may not have access to the kind of information provided through our system of securities registration and therefore may find it difficult to appreciate the unique risks of these pools .... 114 Nowhere did the SEC cite a single financial or academic study about the problems or financial benefits of hedge funds to justify this statement or, indeed, the Rule itself. Instead, the SEC has steadfastly refused to contemplate public investment in hedge funds. Its regulatory approach is to further restrict public investment, justifying this action on the grounds that hedge funds are too "risky" for public investors.'
15 But the SEC has failed to conduct any studies or other cost-benefit analysis of public investment in hedge funds or cite any research on this issue to support its position. If they did so, they would find that there are a number of benefits to public investment in hedge funds, including the historical ability of some of these funds to earn extraordinary risk-adjusted positive returns, as compared with other investment classes and strategies.' 16 The SEC has yet to consider or even acknowledge any of these benefits in its hedge fund rulemaking.
Professor Troy Paredes has ably written on the regulatory forces driving the SEC's hedge fund regulation and its economic failures.
1 8 He attributes SEC regulatory action to a precautionary principle approach effected by cognitive psychology and the political economy of public demand. 1 9 SEC fears of future hedge fund collapses, possible capital markets disruption, and the investor losses these events may engender have been exacerbated by the availability heuristic.1 2 Consequently, the SEC has adopted a precautionary approach towards regulation of hedge funds, despite the absence of certain evidence on their risk parameter and the regulatory cost of such action. 121 The SEC is also painfully aware of the public criticism it received for its inaction and failure to properly regulate and supervise the U.S. capital market in the wake of the Enron/WorldCom scandals. 122 The result was congressional action in the form of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 123 SEC regulation of hedge funds thus has a classic political-economy rationale: It creates an appearance that the SEC is proactively responding to the perceived hedge fund risk and is responsive to congressional and popular interest in hedge funds. An alternative course would likely have raised further congressional ire and resulted in adverse consequences for the SEC, such as reduced funding and prestige.'
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There are also other, complementary explanations in addition to the regulatory forces Professor Paredes cites. Regulation of hedge funds comports with the SEC's aggrandizing and expansionist regulatory tendencies. 125 Hedge fund activities historically have been largely beyond SEC purview. SEC attempts at hedge fund regulation represent a move to seize regulatory turf from other agencies responsible for supervising the system-wide effects of hedge funds. 126 Similarly, the SEC's conduct has monopolistic attributes: the Agency appears unaware of the costs of its regulation, without comprehension of existing competitive forces and alternatives. 1 2 7
There are also other political-economy explanations for the SEC's conduct. Regulating hedge funds allows the SEC to petition Congress for increased appropriations and staffing to implement such regulation. Furthermore, the SEC's approach pays heed to the general public's oftexpressed fear of these investments as complex, high risk, and a disruptive and negative presence on the U.S. capital market.
The exact mix of these forces is debatable, but it is clear that the SEC never overtly appeared to be acting in response to, or with acknowledgement of, the new capital markets paradigm.
B. HEDGE FUND CONSEQUENCES
Historically, the SEC's prohibitory regulation of public investment in hedge funds would likely suffice to address the above concerns. Retail investors effectively would be barred from hedge fund investment and would no longer be exposed to their labeled, unsuitable risks. However, the new regulatory paradigm compromises the effectiveness of SEC regulation. Ordinary investors still demand hedge fund investments due to their perceived unique and compelling benefits. 129 The financial market in the new paradigm responds to this demand by engineering permitted investments with characteristics that mimic hedge funds. 128. Nonetheless, it would appear that certain of these forces are dominant. If the SEC were to permit public offering of hedge funds it would also sustain an aggrandizement explanation as well as one species of the political economy explanation due to the increased resources the SEC would require to implement such a regime. We can therefore surmise that the forces delineated above, which sustain restricted investment in hedge funds, are the primary drivers of regulation.
129. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 115. 130. 1 term these substitute investments "black market capital" and have written extensively on this phenomenon in Black Market Capital, a companion piece to this essay. See Davidoff, supra note 92. Investors also purchase these investments through surreptitious means on a true black [Vol. 2 may also seek alternative markets, whether private or foreign, to make hedge fund investments. Finally, retail investors may be prohibited from investing directly in hedge funds but ultimately still become materially exposed to this risk, to the extent it exists, through intermediary investments. The end result is that the SEC's hedge fund regulatory purpose-limiting retail investor exposure to hedge fund risk-is circumvented. And this is exactly what has happened. The remainder of this Part sets forth a number of examples.
Hedge Fund Substitute Products
Recent hedge fund adviser initial public offerings illustrate the ability of market actors faced with prohibitory regulation to structure financial products side-stepping this bar. Hedge fund advisers are simply that: they are the corporate entities that create and administer the actual hedge and private equity funds. Their revenue and profit is derived principally from the so-called "two-and-twenty"-the typical 2% administrative fee that the adviser charges with respect to assets under management, and a 20% profitsharing fee with respect to fund profits over a pre-set hurdle rate.
1 31 As such, their performance is derivative of the funds they advise. 1 3 2 The success or failure of a fund adviser is thus almost wholly dependent upon the fortunes of their underlying funds. However, hedge funds themselves are effectively barred from making a public offering because of restrictions imposed by the Investment Company Act 133 and the Advisers Act. 34 Yet, unlike the funds themselves, hedge fund advisers do not automatically come under the aegis of these Acts for purposes of these restrictions. Rather, since they are companies whose business happens to be advising hedge funds, they are treated under the federal securities laws as normal operating companies. Consequently, these advisers can publicly raise capital without triggering the application of the Investment Company Act and can otherwise avoid the relevant Advisers Act restrictions on fees. 35 Hedge fund adviser initial public offerings thus offer a viable alternative for retail investors to derivatively invest in hedge funds. Market actors have embraced this alternative structure. In 2007, there were three market. They alternatively make foreign purchases where these public investments are legally permitted. See hedge fund adviser initial public offerings. 3 6 These advisers raised an aggregate amount of $5.186 billion, comprising 9.2% of the U.S. initial public offering market during this time period. 37 The market has succeeded in providing a substitute product for hedge funds, which the SEC does not regulate in a similar manner.
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Exchange-traded funds (ETFs) and indexes that have been created to track hedge fund performance are also marketed to retail investors as "hedge fund" substitutes, providing such investors the ability to capture the benefits of hedge funds. 138 In the United States there are multiple single strategy "hedge fund-type" ETFs. 139 Many investment advisers now recommend that clients use these single-product ETFs if they want to "build their own" hedge funds. 140 These ETFs are also often based on index products that attempt to achieve similar returns. It is now estimated that there are twenty-one such indexes for hedge funds. 141 In addition to synthetic hedge funds discussed supra at Part I.C., there is also a new breed of mutual fund: the hedged mutual fund. These funds employ "hedge-fund-like" trading strategies and leverage and hedging to the extent permitted under the Investment Company Act. 142 As with other hedge fund substitute investments, hedged mutual funds are often marketed to retail investors as hedge fund alternatives. 143 To accommodate this growth and these new funds, Morningstar has created a new mutual fund category: "Long/Short." 144 According to Morningstar, as of December 31, 2007 there were 162 mutual funds under this category. 
Black Market Markets
The private market is also providing alternatives for hedge funds that want the benefits of a public listing but are currently barred from accessing this market or otherwise do not want to do so for other regulatory reasons. The listings of Oaktree and Apollo on GSTrUE are strong examples. 1 46 Hedge funds have also responded to U.S. regulatory prohibitions by going abroad to publicly raise capital from retail investors. For example, from 2005 through to 2007 sixteen hedge funds and funds-of-funds sponsored have made initial public offerings on Euronext, the LSE or AIM, raising a total of $5.578 billion. 147 These funds are not just listing in Europe in response to the regulatory bar in the United States on such public capital raising and listing; they are also using the opportunity to tap into demand [Vol. 2 and offer U.S. investors this public investment opportunity from abroad. 148 Moreover, the increasing competitiveness of the global capital market and regulators encourages European listings of hedge funds. And the European exchanges are rapidly developing regulatory architecture to accommodate and compete for hedge fund listings. The principal exchanges in Europe competing for these listings are Euronext and the LSE. Euronext has traditionally had a regulatory advantage over the LSE, since the LSE has imposed greater listing and offering strictures than those required by Euronext, which only requires the bare minimum mandated by E.U. regulation. 1 49 However, in October 2006, the FSA announced an initiative to consider permitting hedge funds-of-funds to be generally marketed to retail investors.150 The FSA is also currently implementing revised LSE listing rules to further accommodate hedge funds and private equity listings. 151 In anticipation of these rule revisions, the LSE has announced the establishment of a dedicated new market, the Specialist Fund Market, for institutional investors and issuers of single strategy hedge funds and private equity vehicles. 152 This market, which is deliberately less regulated than the Nonetheless, the new paradigm has the potential to spur the SEC in the near term toward more economic regulation-regulation more responsive to market competition. The forces of financial innovation, particularly increasingly sophisticated academic finance research, also provide the SEC the tools to regulate more intelligently.
1 6 1 The SEC, though, has been slow to account for the new paradigm in its regulation by adopting modem regulatory techniques such as cost-benefit analysis. 162 The SEC's failure to consider its hedge fund regulation using these tools and with heed to the new paradigm is just one illustration.
But the new paradigm is inevitably coming. The SEC's failure risks not only its competitiveness in the regulated public markets, but it also raises the specter of a regulatory race-to-the-bottom as the new paradigm's competitive forces increasingly force the SEC to act. Yet, without a sound regulatory approach, the SEC has a greater chance of regulating to uneconomical political interests.
A telling illustration comes not just from the SEC's regulatory experience with hedge funds, but also from its recent adoption of relaxed foreign private issuer de-registration rules and rules permitting these issuers to utilize international financial reporting standards when listing and offering securities in the United States. 163 The SEC did not conduct any substantive cost-benefit analysis or rely on any research or study to regulate with respect to these items.164 Instead, the SEC appeared to be deregulating in response to external political forces spurred by competitive pressure.1 6 1
This regulation might still have been appropriate, but future SEC regulation would be on sounder firmament if the SEC adopted a holistic approach and more rigorous regulatory techniques. The new regulatory paradigm requires not only a rethink of the securities laws but the entirety of the regulatory process. 
